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Religious Civil Rights In Public High Schools: The
Supreme Court'Speaks on Equal Access
RICHARD F. DuNcAN*
In 1984, the same year the Equal Access Act' was signed into law
by President Reagan, Richard John Neuhaus wrote his seminal book,
The Naked Public Square.2 According to Neuhaus, the "naked public
square is the result of political doctrine and practice that would exclude
religion and religiously grounded values from the conduct of public
business. The doctrine is that America is a secular society." 3
In other words, the naked public square is a form of religious
apartheid, 4 a systematic exclusion of religious ideas, expression, and
symbols from public life. The result is a pervasively hostile and chilling
environment for religious persons who venture onto this intellectually
and spiritually sterile landscape.
At the center of the attempt to strictly secularize public life in
America is the public school system. Whether caused by what Professor
McConnell calls "the elite culture's suspicion toward religion" 5 or by
an overzealous and erroneous notion of the extra-constitutional principle
of separation between church and state, 6 many public school officials
have attempted to suppress religious expression on campus.
Sherman S. Welpton Jr. Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law. The author of this Article co-authored an amicus brief for the Rutherford Institute
in Board of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). I wish to express my appreciation
to John Whitehead, the national president of the Rutherford Institute and my co-author
of the amicus brief in support of equal access. I also wish to acknowledge the University
of Nebraska College of Law for furnishing financial support for this Article in the form
of a Ross McCollum Summer Research Grant.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 4071-4074 (1988).
2. R. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLC SQUAm: RELIGON " DEmocitAcY IN AMER-
ICA (1984).
3. Id. at vii. "The case can be made that the great social and political devastations
of our century have been perpetrated by regimes of militant secularism, notably those of
Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. That is true, and it suggests that the naked public square is a
dangerous place." Id. at 8.
4. See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of
Religious Speech By Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 32 (1986); Whitehead, Avoiding
Religious Apartheid: Affording Equal Treatment for Student-Initiated Religious Expression
in Public Schools, 16 PEPPERDNE L. REv. 229 (1989).
5. McConnell, Religious Freedom: A Surprising Pattern, II CHRIsT LEOAL
Soc'Y Q. 5 (1990).
6. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 27 (recognizing that the free speech rights of
religious citizens are often "denied in the name of separation of church and state"). The
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Evidence of official bias against religious expression in public schools
is abundant. Paul C. Vitz, a professor of psychology at New York
University, conducted an extensive study of ninety widely used elementary
and secondary textbooks and concluded that public school textbooks are
both biased and censored. 7 "And the nature of the bias is clear: Religion,
traditional family values, and conservative political and economic po-
sitions have been reliably excluded from children's textbooks." ' For
example, one social studies book contained thirty pages on the Pilgrims,
including the first Thanksgiving; however, the book did not contain even
one word or image that referred to religion as a part of Pilgrim life. 9
Another text discussed the life of Joan of Arc without a single reference
to any religious aspect of her life. 10 Not only are these examples clear
evidence of bias against religious references in school texts, but they
phrase "separation between church and state" is not part of the written Constitution. Its
source is a letter, written more than 10 years after the Bill of Rights was ratified, from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association. 8 WRrriNos OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
113-14 (H. Washington ed. 1854). Jefferson's literary metaphor was canonized as part of
the Supreme Court's establishment clause doctrine over a century later in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). As Chief Justice Rehnquist has observed, it is
"impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
7. P. VITZ, CENsoRsHM,: EVIDENCE OF BIAs IN OUR CE.DREN's TEXTBOOKS 1
(1986).
8. Id. Professor Vitz made clear that he found no evidence of a conscious
conspiracy to censor textbooks. "Instead, a very widespread secular and liberal mindset
appears to be responsible. This mindset pervades the leadership in the world of education
(and textbook publishing) and a secular and liberal bias is its inevitable consequence."
Id.
9. Id. at 3. Professor Vitz also recounts an interesting anecdote concerning this
book: "One mother whose son is in a class using this book wrote me to say that he
came home and told her that 'Thanksgiving was when the Pilgrims gave thanks to the
Indians.' The mother called the principal of this suburban New York City school to point
out that Thanksgiving was when the Pilgrims thanked God. The principal responded by
saying 'that was her opinion' - the schools could only teach what was in the books!"
Id.
10. Id. Still another example concerns textbook censorship of a story written by
the Nobel laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer:
In his original story the main character, a boy, prayed "to God" and later
remarked "Thank God." In the story as presented in the sixth grade reader
the words "to God" were taken out and the expression "Thank God" was
changed to "Thank goodness." These changes not only represent a clear case
of removing God from our textbooks, but they also transform the story. That
is, by removing God, the spiritual dimension is taken out, and the story's clear
answer to the boy's prayer is blunted or negated; and, of course, the historical
accuracy of the author's portrayal of small town Jewish life in Eastern Europe
is also falsified.
Id. at 3-4.
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also clearly demonstrate that children assigned these books are being
taught a grossly distorted version of history.
Discrimination against religious expression is not limited to bias in
textbooks. The Rutherford Institute, a legal defense organization created
to protect religious civil rights, has defended numerous religious students
-against censorship in the public schools. For example, one recent case
involved a third-grade girl in a Wisconsin public school who was told
by her teacher that her valentine art project could not be displayed with
the other children's because she had written "I love Jesus" and "Jesus
is what love is all about" on her valentines." In another case, a ten-
year-old girl was banned from reading her Bible on the school bus by
the principal of her Virginia public school. 2 In a third case, a nineteen-
year-old public high school senior in New York was told by school
officials that he could not perform a rap song in the school's variety
show unless he agreed to censor all references in the song to Jesus Christ
and Christianity. 3 Legal action in all three of these cases vindicated the
free speech rights of the student victims; however, the fact that legal
recourse was necessary to establish so basic a right illustrates the chilling
environment that religious children often encounter in strictly secularized
public schools.
Religious students also have encountered widespread discrimination
in public school extracurricular programs.14 During congressional hearings
on the Equal Access Act, witness after witness testified about discrim-
inatioi against "student-initiated, extracurricular, religious speech.",
This testimony led the Senate Judiciary Committee to conclude that the
record established "a reasonable perception of state hostility toward
religious speech.' ' 6 The result was enactment of legislation designed, in
11. ACTION: A MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF THE RtmRoRD INsTrTrUrTE 4 (May,
1990).
12. ACTIoN: A MONTHLnY PUBLICATION OF THE RUTmRFORD INsTrrUTE 5 (October,
1989).
13. ACTION: A MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF THE RUTHERFORD INsTrrrTE 2 (April,
1990). The censored lyrics included the following: "My name is Kenny Green, and I'm
a Jesus machine. I love Jesus Christ for he is not mean. I became born again at the age
of 14. Now I live for Jesus Christ. Now I am his machine." Id.
14. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110' S. Ct. 2356 (1990). "The committee
reports indicate that the [Equal Access] Act was intended to address perceived widespread
discrimination against religious speech in public schools." Id. at 2366.
15. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984). The nature of religious
discrimination in the public schools was described by Bonnie Bailey, a witness before a
House subcommittee, as follows: "We need legislation to protect our students' rights, to
protect our freedom of speech because it's wrong that we can use the name of God
profanely at school but we can't use it reverently." H.R. REP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1984).
16. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984).
1990]
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the words of Senator Levin, "to protect students who are being dis-
criminated against in secondary schools today based on the religious
content of their speech.""'
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Board of Education v.
Mergens, s which upheld the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act
and decided that the Act was violated on the facts before the Court,
must be viewed against this background of governmental discrimination
and the struggle for religious civil rights. Mergens is truly a civil rights
case, and we must heed its lessons if we are serious about our claim
to be a fair, open, and pluralistic society.
I. EQUAL AccEss ACT
After the landmark decision in Widmar v. Vincent,' 9 the Equal
Access Act should have been unnecessary. In Widmar, a public university
denied a student religious group access to university meeting facilities
that were otherwise generally available for use by student organizations. °
Finding that the university had created "a forum generally open for use
by student groups,"'" the Supreme Court held that the school's exclusion
of religious speech from that forum violated the free speech clause of
the first amendment." Significantly, the Court reaffirmed the principle
that "religious worship and discussion" are forms of speech and as-
sociation entitled to all the protections of the first amendment, 3 and
also recognized that the free, exercise clauseu is offended by "content-
based discrimination against ... religious speech." 25 As Professor Lay-
cock has put it so well: "Whether one starts with the principle that the
free speech clause requires content-neutral regulation of speech, or with
the principle that the religion clauses require strict neutrality toward
religion, one arrives immediately at the result in Widmar."'26
17. 130 CoNG. REc. S8355 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Levin).
See also H.R. REP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (the purposes of the Equal
Access Act "are to eliminate discrimination against student religious groups that occurs
when such groups are denied access to school facilities and to establish a policy of fair,
even-handed treatment").
18. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
19. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
20. Id. at 264-65.
21. Id. at 267.
22. Id. at 270-77. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
23. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
24. U.S. CoNs. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
25. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
26. Laycock, supra note 4, at 11.
[Vol. 24:111
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ind. L. Rev. 114 1990-1991
EQUAL ACCESS
Despite the apparent applicability of Widmar to public school ex-
tracurricular programs, many public school systems continued to exclude
religious student groups from extracurricular facilities.2 7 In one case,
school officials went so far as to prohibit students from praying together
in a car in a school parking lot.2 Congress enacted the Equal Access
Act to eliminate these discriminatory policies and "to clarify and confirm
the First Amendment rights ... [of] public school students Who desire
voluntarily to exercise those rights during extracurricular periods of the
school day. ''29
The Equal Access Act applies to any public secondary school that
receives financial assistance from the federal government.' It provides
that, if a public school subject to the Act maintains "a limited open
forum," the school may not deny equal access to student meetings "on
the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of
the speech at such meetings."
3 2
The key term, "limited open forum," is defined in section 4071(b). 3
Under this provision, a public secondary school maintains a limited open
forum (and is thereby subject to the equal access obligation) whenever
it "grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum
related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional
time.'' In other words, if a public high school recognizes even one
noncurriculum-related student group, the equal access requirement is
triggered and the school must allow other student groups to meet on
a non-discriminatory basis.
27. "Despite Widmar, many school administrators across the country are prohibiting
voluntary, student-initiated religious speech at the secondary ,school level. Generally, those
administrators act not from hostility toward religion but from ignorance of the law and
erroneous legal advice." H.R. RaP. No. 710, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984). See also S.
REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1984).
28. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1984).
29. Id. at 3. During Senate debate, Senator Levin explained the connection between
Widmar and the Equal Access Act as follows:
I am persuaded that the pending amendment is constitutional in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Widmar against Vincent. This amendment merely
extends a similar constitutional rule as enunciated by the Court in Widmar to
secondary schools.
130 CoNo. R c. S8355 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Levin).
30. The term "secondary school" is defined as "a public school which provides
secondary education as determined by State law." 20 U.S.C. § 4072(1) (1988).
31. Id. § 4071(a). Obviously, in the modern welfare state, the Act's coverage of
public high schools is essentially universal.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 4071(b).
34.. Id. "Noninstructional time" is defined as "time set aside by the school before
actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." Id. §
4072(4).
19901
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Although the term "limited open forum" resembles the constitutional
concept of "limited public forum," the two phrases should not be
confused. The Equal Access Act creates a legislatively defined, artificial
construct, "and comparisons with the constitutional cases can be mis-
leading.""
II. THE MEROENS LrIGATION
A. Background, Facts, and Lower Court Decisions
Discrimination against student-initiated, religious speech in public
schools did not stop following passage of the Equal Access Act. When
confronted with claims under the Act by religious students excluded
from extracurricular facilities, public school officials usually claimed
either that the Act was inapplicable or that it was constitutionally void
under the establishment clause.36 The story of Bridget Mergens (now
Bridget Mergens Mayhew) and her attempt to organize a Bible study
club at Westside High School in Omaha, Nebraska is typical.
In January 1985, Mergens, then a student at Westside, requested
permission to form a Bible study club at the school.37 Although the
school allowed approximately thirty other student groups to meet on
campus after school hours and had never before denied any student
group access to the school,3" Westside officials decided to exclude the
Bible study club based upon their belief that "a religious club at the
school would violate the Establishment Clause." 3 9
35. Laycock, supra note 4, at 36. The statutory definition goes far beyond the
Supreme Court's cases. "Most notably, government speech does not create a constitutional
public forum, but a school-sponsored student group that is not curriculum related ...
creates a statutory open forum." Id.
36. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2363 (1990); Garnett
v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989).
37. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362. The purpose of the proposed club was "to permit
the students to read and discuss the Bible, to have fellowship, and to pray together."
Id. Membership in the club was voluntary and open to all students without regard to
religious affiliation. Id.
38. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 110
S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
- 39. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2363. Westside officials took a very hard line in
opposing the proposed Bible study club. In fact, the school's principal, Dr. Findley, stated
that he would consider "doing away with all clubs at WHS, if necessary" to prevent the
Bible study club from meeting on campus. Mergens v. Board of Educ., No. 85-0-426,
slip op. at 13 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 1988). Of course, as previously discussed, this is exactly
the attitude that led Congress to enact the Equal Access Act. See supra notes 27-29 and
accompanying text.
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The students sued the Board of Education claiming the decision to
exclude the Bible study club violated their rights under the Equal Access
Act and their constitutional rights to freedom of speech, association,
and religion under the first and fourteenth amendments.4 The district
court ruled in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Act was
inapplicable because Westside did not maintain a limited open forum
4
'
and rejected the students' constitutional claims "reasoning that Westside
did not have a limited public forum as set forth in Widmar ... and
that Westside's denial of [the Bible study club] was riasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 4 2
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and held that "[m]any of
the student clubs at WHS ... are noncurriculum-related. ' '43 Therefore,
the court concluded school authorities had violated the Equal Access
Act by excluding the Bible study club from the school's limited open
forum." The court also rejected the school's establishment clause attack
on the Act and further concluded that, under the logic of Widmar,
equal access was constitutionally required "even if Congress had never
passed the [Equal Access Act]." 4
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and prepared to settle the
split in the circuits over the equal access issue." The case presented the
following three major issues: First, whether the Equal Access Act required
Westside to allow the Bible study club to meet on school premises;
second, whether the Act, if so construed, is void under the establishment
clause; and third, whether Westside's exclusion of the Bible study club
violated the students' constitutional rights under the free speech and free
exercise clauses.
40. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2363.
41. Id. District Judge Beam concluded that all of the clubs allowed to meet at
Westside, including a chess club, a scuba diving club, and two service clubs related to
Rotary International, "are curriculum related and tied to the educational function of the
institution." Mergens v. Board of Educ., No. 85-0-426, slip op. at 14 (D. Neb. Feb. 2,
1988).
42. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2363.
43. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1079.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1080.
46. Less than a month before the Eighth Circuit handed down its decision in
Mergens, the Ninth Circuit, on nearly identical facts, had upheld a school district's exclusion
of a student religious group in Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.
1989). For a discussion of other federal cases holding erroneously that the establishment
clause forbids public high schools from granting equal access to student religious groups,
see Laycock, supra note 4, at 5.
1990]
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1. Applicability of Equal Access Act.-As previously discussed, the
key issue concerning the triggering of the Equal Access Act is whether
a public secondary school maintains a "limited open forum." This, in
turn, depends upon whether the school recognizes any one or more
noncurriculum-related student groups. If at least one of the approximately
thirty recognized clubs at Westside were found to be noncurriculum-
related, the school was required to allow the Bible study club equal
access.
Unfortunately, the Act fails to define the key term "noncurriculum-
related student group." Therefore, the Court was required to fill this
statutory gap.
The school argued for a narrow construction of the phrase in order
to maximize "local control" over public education. 47 Essentially, this
approach would have allowed public schools to maintain a closed forum
so long as each recognized student group had at least some tangential
relationship to the curriculum. Thus, Westside officials claimed that all
of the recognized student clubs at the school were curriculum-related.
For example, they argued the chess club "supplement[s] math and science
courses because it enhances students' ability to engage in critical thought
processes." '4 Subsurfers, a scuba diving club, was said to be curriculum
related because it furthers "one of the essential goals of the Physical
Education Department - enabling students to develop life-long recre-
ational interests."' 49 Similarly, the school argued that participation in
Interact and Zonta, clubs in which student members engage in community
service such as collecting food for the poor, "promotes effective citi-
zenship, a critical goal of the WHS curriculum, specifically the Social
Studies Department." 5
The student-respondents in Mergens argued for a broad interpretation
of the phrase "noncurriculum-related." Taking the position that a club
was noncurriculum-related unless it "directly related to curriculum course
work,"'" they claimed that "many noncurriculum-related clubs meet at
WHS."5
2
As the Eighth Circuit had noted, the school's narrow interpretation
would render the Equal Access Act "meaningless." 53 "A school's ad-
47. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2367.
48. Brief for Petitioners at 18-19, Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356
(1990).
49. Id. at 18.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Brief for Respondents at 36, Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356
(1990).
52. Id. at 35.
53. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1078.
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ministration could simply declare that it maintains a closed forum and
choose which student clubs it wanted to allow by tying the purposes of
those student clubs to some broadly defined educational goal.' ' 4 On the
other hand, under the broad interpretation suggested by the students,
the Equal Access Act, like other civil rights legislation before it, would
restrict the power of local authorities to control public school activities.
Such was the tradeoff facing Justice O'Connor and her colleagues as
they prepared to decide the issue.
Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority of six," chose to interpret
the Act broadly to carry out the intent of Congress to eliminate "wide-
spread discrimination against religious speech in public schools,' 6 and
"to provide a low threshold for triggering the Act's requirements.""
Therefore, she interpreted the term "noncurriculum-related student group"
to mean "any student group that does not directly relate to the body
of courses offered by the school.""8
The Court provided a four-part test to determine whether any par-
ticular student group has a direct relationship with the curriculum. A
student group is considered directly related to a school's curriculum if:
1) the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or soon
will be taught, in a regularly offered course; 9
2) the subject matter of the group concerns the body of courses
as a whole; 6°
3) participation in the group is required for a particular course; 6'
or
4) participation in the group results in academic credit. 62
54. Id.
55. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy. In addition, two other Justices
(Marshall and Brennan) concurred and agreed with the majority's broad interpretation of
the Equal Access Act. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ.,
concurring).
56. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366.
57. Id.
58. Id. (emphasis in original). This interpretation is also consistent with the Act's
definition of the sort of student "meeting" that must be accommodated under the statute.
See 20 U.S.C. § 4072(3) (1988) ("The term 'meeting' includes those activities of student
groups which are permitted under a school's limited open forum' and are not directly
related to the school curriculum.") (emphasis added).
59. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366.
60. Id. The court explained that student government generally would qualify as
curriculum-related under this provision "to the extent that it addresses concerns, solicits
opinions, and formulates proposals pertaining to the body of courses offered by the
school." Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
1990]
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If even one student group fails to qualify as curriculum-related under
this test, the school maintains a limited open forum and must allow
equal access. 63
It is difficult to imagine how the Court could have construed the
Act more broadly in favor of student speech. Under Justice O'Connor's
four-part test, most public secondary schools recognize many noncur-
riculum-related student organizations. As a result, the cost of avoiding
maintenance of a limited open forum are high. To close its forum, a
typical public secondary school probably must exclude chess and other
hobby clubs, service clubs, vocation clubs (such as future farmers,
doctors, or lawyers clubs), pep clubs, cheerleaders, and perhaps even
athletics.
Whether a student club is curriculum-related or noncurriculum-related
depends upon the actual curriculum of the particular school. A French
club would directly relate to the curriculum if the school offered (or
planned to offer in the near future) a French language course. 64 Similarly,
a school band or orchestra would be curriculum-related if, but only if,
participation "were required for the band or orchestra classes, or resulted
in academic credit.'65
However, cheerleaders or a pep club would be considered noncur-
riculum-related unless the school offered a cheerleading or pep class,
required participation in cheerleading or the pep club for a particular
course, or granted academic credit for participation in the groups." For
example, if a school grants academic credit in physical education for
students who participate in cheerleading or the pep club, the groups are
curriculum-related and do not create a limited open forum. But if not,
the groups are noncurriculum-related, create a limited open forum, and
trigger the school's equal access obligation.67
The same analysis applies to every student group allowed to meet
on campus. The presence or absence of school sponsorship is' irrelevant
for purposes of the Equal Access Act. It is the subject matter of the
group and its relationship to courses actually and regularly offered as
part of the school's curriculum that determine whether the group is
curriculum related."
63. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
64. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 2366-69.
67. See id. at 2366-67.
68. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 36 ("a school-sponsored student group that is
not curriculum related ... creates a statutory open forum"). See also Mergens, 110 S.
Ct. at 2369 ("our definition of 'noncurriculum related student activities' looks to a school's
actual practice rather than its stated policy").
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Athletic teams are likely to be marginal cases under the Court's
analysis. Is a high school football team curriculum-related? If a school
grants academic credit in physical education for participation in football,
there should be no problem - the football team is curriculum-related. 69
However, if students do not earn academic credit for football, and if
football is not taught as part of the curriculum, the football team is
not curriculum-related and its existence results in a limited open forum. 70
Suppose the school teaches touch or flag football in physical edu-
cation classes. Would this make the football team curriculum-related?
Probably not. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion made clear that the
scuba diving club at Westside was noncurriculum-related even though
Westside's physical education classes teach swimming. 71 The reasoning
appears to be that scuba diving involves much more than swimming. It
appears to follow, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, that tackle
football is noncurriculum-related because it "involves more equipment
and greater risk, and so arguably stands in the same relation to touch
football as scuba diving does to swimming.' ' z7
Clearly, it will not be easy for most public high schools to close
down their limited open forums merely by eliminating one or two
extracurricular activities. Instead, schools bent on avoiding equal access
will need to make deep cuts in student clubs and activities. They may
even need to eliminate pep clubs, cheerleaders, and varsity athletics.
If schools are unwilling to make cuts in popular student activities,
they have only two other choices - grant equal access, or forgo federal
funding. As Justice O'Connor made clear, equal access is "the price a
federally funded school must pay if it opens its facilities to noncurriculum-
related student groups."" Just as other civil rights laws limit the options
69. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366.
70. Id. at 2366-69.
71. Id. at 2369.
72. Id. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2367. One possible strategy to avoid triggering the Equal Access Act is
to schedule all noncurriculum-related student meetings for an activities period during the
regular school day. Because a limited open forum is only created when the school allows
one or more noncurriculum-related clubs to meet before actual classroom instruction begins
or after actual classroom instruction ends, setting aside part of the regular school day
for student clubs to meet arguably would not trigger an equal access obligation under
the Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b), 4072(4) (1988); Strossen, A Constitutional Analysis
of the Equal Access Act's Standards Governing Public School Student Religious Meetings,
24 HARv. J. oN LEoIs. 117, 188 (1987). Notice, however, that this strategy fails if even
one noncurriculum-related group, including cheerleaders, pep clubs, and perhaps athletic
teams, is allowed to meet before or after school. Of course, even if this interpretation
of the Act is adopted and the school limits all noncurriculum-related student clubs to the
activities period, student clubs excluded from the activities period will argue that they
1990]
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of public school officials, the Equal Access Act allows few choices to
those who wish to avoid its nondiscriminatory goals.
2. Equal Access Act and the Establishment Clause.-Westside's
next line of defense against its equal access obligation was to claim the
Equal Access Act was unconstitutional under the establishment clause.
The school claimed that recognition of a student Bible study club con-
stitutes official endorsement of religion and provides the club "with an
official platform to proselytize other students." 7 4 In effect, the argument
equates tolerance with apparent endorsement and appears to be based
on the assumption that the school endorses everything it does not censor.7
In Lemon v. Kurtzman6 the Court formulated a three-part test to
determine whether a statute or practice that touches upon religion is
valid under the establishment clause. First, the statute or practice must
have a secular purpose; second, its primary or principal effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion; and third, it must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
After Widmar, the constitutionality of an equal access policy seemed
reasonably free from doubt. Realistically, school policies that discriminate
against student religious groups pose greater risks under the establishment
clause than do those that treat all groups equally, because these dis-
criminatory policies arguably have the primary or principal effect of
inhibiting religiona.7  An equal access policy, however, is neutral con-
have a constitutional right to equal access under Widmar. This is the issue the Supreme
Court avoided in Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986). The
four Justices who reached the merits in Bender concluded that Widmar is controlling and
mandates equal access to the forum created during the activities period. 475 U.S. at 551-
55 (Burger, C.J., White, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); 475 U.S. at 555-56 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
74. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370.
75. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 14. "The claim of actual endorsement is absurd.
Perhaps in a totalitarian state the government implicitly endorses all that it does not
censor. But no such inference can be drawn in a nation with a constitutional guarantee
of free speech." Id.
76. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
77. Id. at 612-13.
78. The second-prong of the tripart Lemon test states that the establishment clause
is violated by a statute or governmental practice if its primary or principal effect either
advances or inhibits religion. 403 U.S. at 612. See also County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U.,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3102-03 (1989). A school policy that discriminates against religious student
groups sends a message of governmental disapproval of religion, and thus its primary
effect is arguably to inhibit religion. See L. Tams, A~mmIcA CoNsTrrroNA, LAW 1175
(2d ed. 1988) ("A message of exclusion ... is conveyed where the state refuses to let
religious groups use facilities that are open to other groups."). Professor Laycock has
argued that the establishment clause is concerned only with government support for religion.
Thus, he believes that the "suggestion that any inhibition of religion raises establishment
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cerning religious content and serves the secular purpose of ensuring that
extracurricular programs in public schools are truly open and free of
discrimination. 79 Unless equal access in public secondary schools is dif-
ferent in a constitutionally material way from equal access in public
universities, Widmar was powerful authority for upholding the Equal
Access Act.
In Mergens, eight Justices agreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion
that the Equal Access Act is constitutional. However, Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion on this issue fell one vote short of a majority, and
two separate concurring opinions were filed.8 0 The resulting 4-2-2 split
is typical of the Supreme Court's confusing establishment clause juris-
prudence. Regardless, one important point emerged from this judicial
cacophony - for one reason or another, the Equal Access Act is
constitutional.
At least six Justices concluded in Mergens that the Equal Access
Act does not violate the establishment clause.8" Moreover, two additional
Justices agreed "that the Act as applied to Westside could withstand
Establishment Clause scrutiny" so long as the school took certain steps
"to avoid appearing to endorse the Christian Club's goals." 's2 The ninth
Justice, John Paul Stevens, did not reach the establishment clause issue.8 3
Although he noted that the issue was a difficult one, Justice Stevens
observed that he "tends to agree" with the Court "that the Constitution
does not forbid a local school district, or Congress, from bringing
organized religion into the schools so long as all groups, religious or
not, are welcomed equally.'"'
a. The Equal Access Act has a secular purpose
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion applied the logic of Widmar
to the Equal Access Act's waltz through the three-part harmony of the
questions should be disregarded." Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81
CoLum. L. REv. 1373, 1385 (1981).
79. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S 263, 271 (1981).
80. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion on the establishment clause issue was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun. Justices Kennedy
and Scalia and Justices Marshall and Brennan filed concurring opinions on the establishment
clause issue.
81. Although Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred with the judgment of Justice
O'Connor and the plurality, their reasons for upholding the Equal Access Act under the
establishment clause differed significantly. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
82. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378 (Marshall, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1990]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Ind. L. Rev. 123 1990-1991
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
Lemon test."5 As in Widmar, the Court concluded that an equal access
policy has a secular purpose - prevention of discrimination against
religious and other types of speech.8 6 "Because the Act on its face grants
equal access to both secular and religious speech," O'Connor concluded
that its purpose was not to "endorse or disapprove of religion. '8 7
An amicus brief, filed on behalf of the school, argued that the
Equal Access Act was the result of a two-year effort to circumvent the
Court's school prayer decisions "and to promote. religious activities in
the public schools.''8 This assertion was supported, for the most part,
by quoting individual legislators who appeared to be acting on religious
motivation.89 Justice O'Connor gave short shrift to this argument and
concluded that "what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute,
not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the
law."9
b. The Equal Access Act neither advances nor inhibits religion
Westside next argued that the Equal Access Act has the primary
effect of advancing religion, and therefore fails the second prong of the
85. Id. at 2371.
86. Id. Laws prohibiting discrimination against religious speech are similar to statutes
banning employment discrimination on the basis of religion. Both serve basic civil rights
goals which are "equally consistent with the establishment clause." Laycock, supra note
4, at 22.
87. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371.
88. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et. al., amici curiae, at
5, Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). One commentator even went so far as to suggest
that the Equal Access Act is tainted because evangelicals "have been preeminent advocates
of equal access both in the courts and in Congress." Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of
Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Ac-
tivities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum
Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 529, 557 n.130 (1985). Apparently, Professor Teitel
believes evangelical Christians should remain silent in the sanctuary and not get involved
in the struggle for civil rights and civil liberties. The Eighth Circuit recently rejected an
argument similar to Professor Teitel's in a case involving a school district's policy prohibiting
dances in the public schools, and stated that "this approach to constitutional analysis
would have the effect of disenfranchising religious groups when they succeed in influencing
secular decisions." Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir. 1989). Cf. McDaniel
v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (striking down a provision of the Tennessee constitution
that disqualified clergy from serving in the legislature).
89. Brief of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et. al., amici curiae, at
6, Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). For example, the brief quotes Senator Denton's
statement that the equal access policy was designed "to restore the constitutional right
to pray in public schools and buildings." Id. Of course, the goal of protecting constitutional
rights of religious expression can be viewed as a secular purpose. It is certainly not an
inherently religious purpose.
90. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371 (emphasis in original).
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Lemon establishment clause test.91 Specifically, the school argued that
"because the student religious meetings are held under school aegis, and
because the state's compulsory attendance laws bring the students together
(and thereby provide a ready-made audience for student evangelists), an
objective observer in the position of a secondary school student will
perceive official school support for such religious meetings."P92
In Widmar, the Court considered a similar argument and concluded,
"[w]e are unpersuaded that the primary effect of the public forum, open
to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion." 93 The benefit
to religious clubs of access to university facilities on the same basis as
other groups was deemed merely "incidental" and therefore not a vi-
olation of the establishment clause. 94
However, in Garnett v. Renton School District, the Ninth Circuit
attempted to distinguish Widmar from equal access in public secondary
schools and concluded that "[t]he religious activity proposed in this
case, which would take place at a time closely associated with a highly
structured school day, would be far more likely to appear to enjoy
school sponsorship than a group on a college campus.'"'9 In reaching
this conclusion, the Garnett court placed great weight on the "im-
pressionability" of high school students, compulsory attendance laws
"that make students a captive audience," and "the role of public schools
in inculcating democratic ideals.'"'9
Reduced to its essence, the Ninth Circuit's analysis amounts to an
unsubstantiated fear that students will mistakenly conclude that the
government endorses everything it does not censor.Y The basic flaw in
this view is its failure to recognize the difference between voluntary,
student-initiated speech and governmental speech. As Justice O'Connor
observed in Mergens, "there is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the establishment clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect.''98 The establishment clause does not mandate govern-
mental censorship of private religious speech. It merely requires that
government neither advance nor inhibit religion.
The Mergens plurality followed this logic and concluded that public
secondary school students are sufficiently mature to understand that
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 454 U.S. at 273.
94. Id. at 273-74.
95. 865 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989).
96. Id.
97. See Brief of the Rutherford Institute et. al., amici curiae, at 8, Mergens, 110
S. Ct. 2356 (1990); Laycock, supra note 4, at 18.
98. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (emphasis in original).
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equal access for religious groups "evinces neutrality toward, rather than
endorsement of, religious speech."" This conclusion is supported by
social science research '°° as well as congressional fact-finding.' 1' For
example, in his recent book on children and education, Professor David
Moshman, an educational psychologist and an expert in adolescent rea-
soning and intellectual development, specifically considered the issue of
apparent endorsement under the Equal Access Act and reached the
following conclusion:
It appears, then, that the Equal Access Act, which is limited
to secondary students, is constitutionally acceptable in that sec-
ondary students, like the college students in Widmar, are capable
of understanding a school's nonendorsement of religion ...
Concerns about a perceived establishment of religion can be
handled through announcements, notices on bulletin boards, etc.,
rather than through the more restrictive alternative of abridging
freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the free exercise
of religion. 1°2
Moreover, today's youth are confronted with a myriad of difficult choices
not faced by past generations. These choices range from whether to
have an abortion to whether one should file a lawsuit against his or
her parents, teachers, or school. These experiences have caused one
commentator to conclude that the "dividing line between childhood and
99. Id. at 2373.
100. See D. MosEI.MA, CMDRN, EDUCATION, AND M FIRST AmENDmNT: A
PSYCHOI.EOAL ANALysIs 114-19 (1989); Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-
Initiated Religious Activity in Public High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 507-09 (1983)
(collecting research in the field of adolescent psychology suggesting "that high school
students are generally independent and capable of critical inquiry"). Dr. Moshman was
called as an expert witness for the students at trial in the Mergens case.
101. In connection with its consideration of the Equal Access Act, the Senate
Judiciary Committee examined the evidence and specifically concluded "that students below
the college age can understand that an equal access policy is one of State neutrality toward
religion, not one of State favoritism." S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984).
The Mergens plurality cited this report and noted that deference was due to this congressional
finding of fact. 110 S. Ct. at 2372.
102. D. Mosupw., supra note 100, at 118. At trial in Mergens, Dr. Moshman
testified that beyond the age of twelve, children "all seem to be capable of formal
reasoning." Joint Appendix at 390, Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). He further testified
that the "typical high school student is capable of a wide -variety of abstract abilities,
being able to look logically at arguments, being able to formulate hypotheses, [and] being
able to test hypotheses." Id. at 391-92. Dr. Moshman's conclusion at trial was the same
he reached in his book - the average high school student is able to understand that
toleration of religious student groups as part of an equal access policy does not constitute
official endorsement or sponsorship. Id. at 397.
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adulthood is being unmistakably eroded."' 0 3 If teenagers are competent
to make decisions as important as whether to have an abortion or to
bring a lawsuit, they should be able to understand that equal treatment
of religious clubs does not amount to sponsorship or endorsement of
religion.
In fact, Dr. Moshman's expert testimony at trial supported the
conclusion that Westside's exclusion of student religious groups from
the extracurricular program risks violating the establishment clause pro-
scription against official hostility toward religion." 4 A potentially un-
constitutional "inhibition" of religion exists when a school denies equal
access, because students who are aware of the school's decision to exclude
religious clubs "may then perceive the absence of religious clubs and
the presence of others" and conclude that the official attitude of the
school indicates "some degree of hostility toward religious [clubs].'0'1
Compulsory attendance laws were not seen by the plurality as af-
fecting the validity of the Equal Access Act. The Act contains specific
safeguards designed to ensure that student religious meetings are "vol-
untary and student-initiated,"''1 6 and that the equal access obligation
occurs only when the school allows "noncurriculum related student groups
to meet on school premises during noninstructional time."' 7 Thus, there
103. See Brief of the Rutherford Institute et. al., amici curiae, at 7, Mergens, 110
S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (quoting N. PosTmAN, THE DiSAPERANCE OF CHILDHOOD 75 (1982)).
104. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
105. Joint Appendix at 398-99, Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
106. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1988) provides:
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to
conduct a meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides
that-
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government, or
its agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious
meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly
conduct of educational activities within the school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend
activities of student groups.
Admittedly, this language is not a model of the drafting art. It should not be interpreted
to mean that public secondary schools may not sponsor any student groups. Rather, it
should be interpreted as a non-exclusive "safe harbor" by which schools that maintain
a limited open forum can meet their equal access obligations to non-sponsored, noncur-
riculum-related student organizations. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
107. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Section 4072(4) defines the term
"noninstructional time" as "time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruction
begins or after actual classroom instruction ends." Id. § 4072(4).
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is no possibility of a "captive audience" for student religious meetings
held outside regular school hours.
To the contrary, state education laws which require students to
attend school and which create a public school monopoly for state-
financed elementary and secondary education, give rise to a special need
to protect religious students from being treated like outsiders whose
religious beliefs must be checked at the public schoolhouse door.1°s As
the Court observed in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,'°9 "In our system, students may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to com-
municate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments
that are officially approved."" 0'
Finally, the Equal Access Act is perfectly consistent with the role
of the public schools in inculcating democratic ideals. Our society's
commitment to freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and pluralism
is demonstrated by public schools when they comply with the Equal
Access Act. In fact, the schools serve as poor role models when they
discriminate against and deny equal access to religious student groups.
"Whatever the risk that some students will perceive an open forum as
an endorsement of all groups that participate, that risk is far outweighed
by the actual and apparent hostility in a rule that allows students to
talk about anything except religion.""'
c. The Equal Access Act does not result in excessive entanglement
between government and religion
Justice O'Connor and the plurality quickly dismissed Westside's final
establishment clause argument - that compliance with the Act "risks
excessive entanglement between government and religion.""' 2 The Equal
Access Act provides safeguards to ensure that faculty and employees of
the school may be present at religious meetings "only in a nonparti-
cipatory capacity."" 3 In other words, although the Act allows custodial
108. Professor Dent made the same point in his important article about religious
objections to public school curriculum. He argued that in "our era of high taxes and
extensive social welfare benefits," a failure to accommodate religious beliefs "discriminates
against the religious by forcing them either to forego a free education or to compromise
their religion." Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 939-
40 (1988).
109. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
110. Id. at 511.
111. Laycock, supra note 4, at 20.
112. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3) (1988). This provision may be attacked under the free
speech and free exercise clauses by teachers who claim a right to sponsor or participate
in student religious meetings. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Laycock, supra
note 4, at 30-31.
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oversight of student religious meetings to maintain order and discipline,
it prohibits active participation by agents of the school in religious
activities. Thus, there is no impermissible entanglement."
4
Justice O'Connor further recognized that an equal access policy is
less likely to entangle the school with religion than is a policy of religious
censorship." Although an equal access policy is satisfied when the school
adopts a strictly neutral, nondiscriminatory posture as to all points of
view, a censorship policy requires the school to determine which groups,
which words, and which activities are "religious" and therefore forbid-
den. 6 The policy of religious censorship also results in "a continuing
need to monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule.""17
Clearly, as between equal access and censorship, the safer policy under
the establishment clause is equal access.
d. The views of Justices Kennedy and Scalia
As previously discussed,"' although only four Justices joined in
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, two additional Justices are even
more permissive of governmental accommodation of religion. Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, voted to
uphold the Equal Access Act because it satisfies two establishment clause
principles. First, the Act does not give direct benefits to religion "in
such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a (state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so."' 9 Second, the Act does not "coerce any
student to participate in a religious activity."'' 2 Therefore, Justices Ken-
nedy and Scalia concurred in the judgment upholding the constitutionality
of the Equal Access Act.' 2 '
3. Hate Groups, Satanic Clubs, and Other Fringe Organizations.-
Critics of the Equal Access Act argue that it will open public high
schools to student clubs promoting hate, satanism, and other sorts of
extremism. 22 It is true that once a public secondary school creates a
114. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373.
115. Id.
116. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.11 (1981).
117. Id. See Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373.
118. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
119. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting County of
Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3136 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
120. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 2376.
122. See, e.g., Note, The Equal Access Act: A Haven For High School 'Hate
Groups,' 13 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 589 (1985).
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limited open forum, the Act prohibits discrimination against student
meetings "on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings.' ' '3 Thus, if a school allows
even one noncurriculum-related club to meet on campus, it must allow
equal access to all student clubs and may not censor the message of
any such club. 124 However, this theoretical possibility of extremist clubs
being allowed equal access to public school facilities does not justify
the exclusion of religious clubs from campus. The proper response to
clubs spewing hate is not the suppression of clubs expressing love,
worship, redemption, and forgiveness.
Neither the Equal Access Act nor student religious clubs are the
cause of hate groups or satanic activity on campus. An hysterical over-
reaction to the Court's decision in Mergens is not part of the solution.
A more rational approach to the issue should take into account a number
of considerations. First, the likelihood of extremist groups seeking equal
access to public school facilities is, at best, remote. Equal access has
been the law for years at public universities, and there is no evidence
of a problem concerning satanic cults or hate groups seeking formal
access to campus. These kinds of groups dwell in the dark, not in the
light.
Moreover, if bigots or satanists are active in the public schools, and
if they decide to apply for equal access, what have we lost? Equal access
does not create these groups; it only allows them to surface and meet
openly. This, in turn, gives public school officials an opportunity to
respond to their ideas of hate and evil. As always, the cure for evil
speech is good speech.' "
Finally, the Court made clear in Mergens that the Equal Access Act
does not limit a school's authority to prohibit student -meetings that
"interfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the
school."' 1 6 Clearly, there is no need for panic in the wake of Mergens.
We should embrace the free speech and civil rights benefits of equal
access and prepare to deal calmly and rationally with the remote pos-
sibility of student extremists surfacing to demand the right to meet.
123. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
124. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
125. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
For example, upon learning of hate group activity on campus, school officials may respond
by calling a school assembly to discuss our society's commitment to equality and civil
rights. School officials also may decide to offer counseling to the emotionally disturbed
children who participate in these hate groups.
126. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2367; 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4). See also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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4. Free Speech and Free Exercise Rights of Religious Students.-
Because the Court concluded that Westside's exclusion of the Bible study
club was unlawful under the Equal Access Act, it did not decide the
students' claims under the free speech and free exercise clauses. 127 As
a result, a number of interesting questions remain unanswered.
Does Widmar apply to public high schools (and junior high schools),
or is it limited to public universities? If Widmar applies to public high
schools, are high schools like Westside "limited public forums" for
student organizations? A closely related question is: At what point does
a school activity program become a "limited public forum" in a con-
stitutional sense?'
Although the Mergens plurality clearly indicated that private student
speech endorsing religion is protected by the free speech and free exercise
clauses, 29 the exact contours of that protection will need to be defined
in a future case, should one arise. Whether such a case arises will be
determined by how well public schools and lower federal courts under-
stand the lessons of Mergens.
III. THE LESSONS OF MEROENS: THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN PuBLIC
ScHOOLs
As Eugene Rostow, former dean of Yale Law School, observed,
"The Supreme Court is, among other things, an educational body, and
the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital national seminar."' 30 If
Rostow is correct, and I believe he is, the opinions in Mergens have
much to teach us about the proper role of religion in public schools.
Mergens is a landmark decision which, like Brown v. Board of
Education,13' carries the struggle for civil rights around a sharp corner.
Mergens makes clear that religion has a legitimate place in the public
schools, and it also makes clear that schools run significant legal risks
when they censor or exclude private religious expression by students.
The Court's school prayer cases did not remove voluntary prayer
from the public schools. At most, the prayer cases preclude state spon-
sored, required, or endorsed prayer or religious worship in public schools. 32
127. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373.
128. For a discussion of the constitutional meaning of limited public forum, see
Laycock, supra note 4, at 45-51.
129. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372.
130. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Hav. L. Rav. 193,
208 (1952).
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
132. See, e.g. Edwards v. Aguilard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (requirement of equal
treatment for creation science and evolution science constituted impermissible state en-
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As the Mergens plurality observed, private student prayer and religious
expression are outside the establishment clause ban and are protected
by the free speech and free exercise clauses.' In other words, the crucial
distinction is not the location of the speech, but rather the identity of
the speaker. Government speech endorsing religion is prohibited even if
it occurs on private property. Private speech endorsing religion is pro-
tected even if it takes place on public property.1'3
Although the precise holding of Mergens involves only the Equal
Access Act, the signals it sends to the public schools and the lower
federal courts are far-reaching. The Court's broad interpretation of the
Equal Access Act determines, almost as a matter of certainty, that Bible
study and other religious clubs will be allowed to meet in most public
high schools throughout the country.'35 The clear line drawn by Justice
O'Connor and the plurality between government speech endorsing religion
and private speech endorsing religion removes the mask of legitimacy
from public school officials who censor religious expression by students
in the name of separation of church and state. Students who wish to
write "I love Jesus" on valentines or sing Christian rap songs in school
talent shows will be welcomed, not excluded, by school officials who
listen to the message of Mergens. School board attorneys who understand
Mergens will advise their clients that it is riskier to censor private religious
speech than it is to tolerate it.
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the phrase "wall of separation
between church and state,"' 3 6 is a hero to those who wish strictly to
exclude religion from public schools and other public places. However,
I believe Jefferson would agree with the decision in Mergens. My support
for this assertion is Jefferson's personal experience as a public educator.
Jefferson was the first school board president for the public schools in
the District of Columbia.'" In fact, an historian of the District of
dorsement of religion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) ("moment of silence" law;
state legislature acted with the intent to endorse and promote prayer); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (required posting of the Ten Commandments in each public school
classroom); School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (required reading of passages
from the Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(required recitation of state-written "nondenominational prayer"); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (state-sponsored religious instruction in public school classrooms
during regular school hours).
133. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372.
134. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 9.
135. See supra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 6.
137. See Wilson, Eighty Years of the Public Schools of Washington-1805 to 1885,
1 RECORDS OF rH COLVmL4 HISTORICAL SocIErY 122 (1897); Whitehead, supra note 4,
at 236.
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Columbia public schools credits Jefferson as "the chief author of the
first plan of public education adopted for the city of Washington. ' ' 38
Interestingly (perhaps devastatingly for those who revere Jefferson as a
strict separationist), the first official report on file indicates that the
principal books then in use in the District of Columbia public schools
were the Bible and Watts Hymnal."19 Jefferson apparently did not believe
that use of these religious texts breached the wall of separation.
It is in the spirit of Thomas Jefferson, public educator, that the
Supreme Court acted in Mergens. The establishment clause does not
require religious apartheid in the public schools. Nor does it require
religious students to pretend that their God does not exist when they
walk through the public schoolhouse door. They are free to speak to
Him, to praise Him, and yes, even to share Him with others "in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours. ' 140
138. Wilson, supra note 137, at 123. See Whitehead, supra note 4, at 236.
139. See Wilson, supra note 137, at 127; Whitehead, supra note 4, at 236.
140. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13
(1969).
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